

Physical Information Security

Fall 2006

Information Assurance

Reading Material

- Secrets of Computer Espionage Chapters 5, 12, and 13
- Steganography tutorial
 - <http://www.jjtc.com/stegdoc/steg1995.html>
- Unofficial TEMPEST faq
 - <http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/tempestintro.html>
- Soft TEMPEST paper
 - <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ih98-tempest.pdf>

Outline

- Physical Data Security
 - Magnetic Disks
 - Paper
- Phone Security
 - Voice
 - Fax
- Emissions Security (EMSEC)
 - TEMPEST

Motivation

- The watcher vs the watched
 - Understand where data can lurk
 - Understand how evidence is handled
- Indirect means of finding information in broader computer systems
 - Range from common sense to arcane
 - Use your limited resources appropriate to the situation

Scope of Physical Access

- Who is allowed to come into physical access?
 - Guarded entrances?
 - Sign in procedures?
 - Cameras?
- How are support employees vetted?
- Do employees work from home?
 - Wireless networks, cordless phones, garbage
 - Employees and family using same computer?
- Do employees work from coffee shops, airports, etc?
 - Stealing laptops, memory keys

Computer Forensics

- Support criminal or civil investigation
 - Generally working with computer disks
 - Perhaps other electronic equipment too
 - e.g., game consoles
- Chain of Evidence
 - Careful documentation of how evidence was handled

Computer Forensics

- Acquiring computer
 - Pull the plug?
 - Document
- Working with disk
 - Investigate on bit copy of disk
 - Protect original!
 - Gather evidence with widely available and understood tools

Hiding Information on File Systems

- Many computer forensics books give guidance for looking
 - Non standard names
 - Non standard extensions
 - Root kit techniques to hide files from browser
 - Non-standard disk sectors
 - NT streams
 - Compressed or UUEncoded data

Slack Space

- File systems allocate fixed chunks to files
- Generally last chunk is not full. This is Slack
 - Could contain remnants of previous allocations
 - Could contain consciously placed data

Encrypting File Systems

- Widely available
 - EFS in Windows XP
 - <http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/>
 - Insert encryption/decryption shim in the file system stack
 - TCFS <http://www.tcfs.it> for Unix/Linux
 - Distributed encrypted file system

Encrypting File System Design Issues

- When is the data encrypted/decrypted/removed?
 - Does data stay decrypted in cache?
 - What happens when a logged on user walks away?
 - Can the spy step up and copy the data?
 - **Zero-Interaction Authentication**, M.D. Croner and B. Noble, ACM MOBICOM, 2002
- How is data recovered if employee leaves or is hit by a bus?
 - Key escrow
- What if you are legally forced to reveal the key?

Deleting Files

- File systems cheat when you ask to delete a file
 - For performance reasons merely update tables to cause file/directory/file system to not be directly accessible
 - Trivial to bring back if you know what to look for
- Reformatting the disk does not remove the data completely either
- A variety of free and commercial products will retrieve deleted/reformatted data and/or reconstruct data from partially damaged disks
 - <http://www.ontrack.com/>

Really Deleting Files

- Wipe or scrub the disk
 - Write 0's over the disk
 - E.g. in unix land - `dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/had`
 - CITES FAQ on disk scrubbing
 - <http://www.cites.uiuc.edu/security/diskscrub/dsfaq.html>
 - A single pass may not suffice
 - **magnetic remanence:** [A] magnetic representation of residual **information** remaining on a magnetic **medium** after the medium has been cleared
 - With special tools, can reconstruct original data from the remanence
- Organizations generally have standards for “wiping” disks before repurposing or destruction
 - CS Dept makes 3 passes for reuse in department and 10 passes if disk is leaving department
 - 20 minutes per GigaByte for 10 passes
 - In extreme cases may even require destroying disks before throwing away (e.g., dipping in acid)

Steganography

- Literally means *covered writing*
 - Similar goals as cryptography
 - Uses open/indirect methods
- Hiding information in other documents
 - E.g., Read every 2nd letter from
 - Apparently neutral's protest is thoroughly discounted and ignored. Isman hard hit. Blockade issue affects pretext for embargo on by products, ejecting suets and vegetable oils.
 - Pershing sails from NY June 1.

Steganography

- Photos are good containers for steganographic messages
 - Embed data without affecting visual quality of resulting image
- Example from S-Tools
 - Embed image
<http://www.jjtc.com/stegdoc/sec306.html>
 - Into image
<http://www.jjtc.com/stegdoc/sec318.html>

Digital Watermarking

- Use steganographic techniques to mark data to prove source of data
 - Identify movie, photo, music piracy
 - Different watermarks can be used to track channel of piracy (e.g., movie theater in Hong Kong vs theater in New York)
- Watermark design constraints
 - Difficult/impossible to remove without affecting data quality

Backups

- Regular backups essential to information assurance
 - Add to headaches to track multiple copies of sensitive data
- Where is the data stored?
 - At least one copy off-site
- Should data be encrypted?
 - Bank of America “lost” personal information from many people from unencrypted backups gone missing in transit to backup storage
- Who has access to create/restore the backups?
 - Separated privileges in OS
- How is backup media destroyed?

Looking at Logs

- Standard logs can be court admissible
- Even if not court admissible can help investigation
 - Mail Logs
 - ISP Logs
 - Web logs

Paper Disposal

- “Dumpster diving” can be an excellent source of information
- Could incinerate or eat the paper
- Generally organizations rely on shredding
 - Gov’t has standard on shredding
 - Many companies and universities do too
 - Many companies outsource (including UIUC)
 - Private citizens also shred
 - Identity theft concerns
 - Makes a nice mulch

Paper Shredding

- Two options
 - Stripping: cut paper into $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$ inch strips
 - Cross-cutting: cut in two dimensions to limit the length of strips
- Gov't requirements specify resulting paper fragment sizes depending on the classification of the data
- Do people really reconstruct documents?
 - Yes, example from US Embassy in Iran
 - <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB21/>

Copier/Printer/FAX Security

- Basic physical concerns
 - Copier/FAX Leaving original on the glass
 - FAX confirmation comes after person left
 - Printer/FAX left in bin until redeemed
 - Information from logs
- Printer/FAX machines that use ribbons leave copies of the original
 - Similar to type writer ribbons
 - Not an issue for ink jet versions

Copier/Scanner/FAX Security

- Bugged imaging devices
 - Large box would be easy to include something to copy aside the images
 - Article about CIA working with Xerox to enhance copier at Soviet Embassy
 - <http://www.editinternational.com/index.php?pag=stor>

Label Output Devices

- Just being conscious of data security and physical security of output devices helps avoid accidents
- In MLS Operating systems associated levels with printer/FAX devices
 - Ensure you don't accidentally send top secret data to lobby printer

FAX Transmission

- Well defined and slow
 - Easy to record and replay using digital tape
 - Commercial buggers exist
- Fax Encryption devices exist
- Use computers to Fax sensitive data if you must
 - Essentially scan, encrypt then send

Phone Security

- Previously discussed legal issues and phone tapping
- Encrypting phones exist
 - Use physical keys
 - “On three, go secure...”
- Potential adversaries for wired PSTN
 - Nation states

IP Phone Security

- Pair-wise computers using encryption like IPSEC
 - PGPfone <http://www.pgpi.org/products/pgpfone/>
- VOIP Services using SIP
 - E.g., vonage
 - Use cryptography in authentication
 - No cryptography on data, although SIP allows for end-to-end encryption
 - Recently make subject to CALEA laws

IP Phone Security

- P2P VOIP, e.g., Skype
- Uses centralized directory services
 - Register users
 - Help users find each other
 - Verify authentication information
- Otherwise, phone conversation does not involve central servers
- Not subject to CALEA, yet
- Uses proprietary protocols
 - Does use fairly standard security mechanisms (including data encryption)
 - Recent independent security evaluation posted
[http://www.skype.com/security/files/2005-031%20security%20e'](http://www.skype.com/security/files/2005-031%20security%20e)

Other Phone Security

- Physical access to a phone yields a lot of information
 - Caller ID logs
 - Redial
 - Speed Dial
- Cordless phone
 - Older phones could be picked up by neighbor's baby monitor
 - Newer phones operate at higher frequencies, use spread spectrum technology, and handset codes
 - But still can be cracked by the dedicated party
 - <http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs2-wire.htm#1>

Cell Phones

- Some cell networks easier to break than others
 - AMPS – Original cell networks were analog and trivial to snoop with police scanners
 - Princess Diana and the “Squidgy” call
 - GSM/ Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) – Going digital blocks analog scanners. GSM adds encryption (A5)
 - Pretty weak. Depending on the version can be cracked real time or within 8 hours
 - Code-Division Multiple Access (CDMA) – Use spread spectrum makes monitoring even more difficult.
- Can buy cell phones with strong encryption
 - Pricy and you need two

Cell Phone Location Tracking

- Can use triangulation to measure distance to surrounding base stations.
- With improved 911 service (E-911) new cell phones will have GPS units embedded
 - Carriers must have 50 meter accuracy for GPS enhanced phones
- Most often used for good
 - Stranded motorists
 - Might be a concern for the paranoid

Emanations Security (EMSEC)



Emanations Security (EMSEC)

- Computing devices and related wires generate electromagnetic signals
 - Sometimes can derive information stored on computer or transmitted on wires
 - **Tempest** was US government codeword for this effort
- Enables at-a-distance snooping
 - Good for movie plots
 - Definitely realm of sophisticated adversary
- Tempest information classified
 - Unofficial information available
<http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/tempestintro.html>
 - Little published in open research

Monitor emanations

- Wim Van Eck in '85 showed how a Video Display Terminal (VDT) could be monitored from up to a kilometer away
 - Published plans for creating such a snooping device relatively cheaply
- How relevant is Van Eck's work now
 - Many more monitors now
 - Lower power
 - More complex screens

Monitor Emanations

- Kuhn and Anderson '98 shows validity of emanations monitoring in today's technology
 - [http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ih98-tempest.](http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ih98-tempest)
- Show two technologies
 - Using a AM radio to track the monitor display
 - Experimenting with what can be seen from a traditional TEMPEST monitor

Radio Tracking Monitors

- Kuhn and Anderson's paper provide techniques to determine pixel values that will generate specified AM signal
- Tempest for Eliza is a tool that implements this algorithm to play songs on your monitor
 - <http://www.erikyyy.de/tempest/>

Radio Virus

- Attack scenario does not use radio to monitor random screen contents
 - Rather suggests it is a virus that uses the radio to send information back to home base
 - Virus wakes up at night and starts transmitting interesting data over AM monitor signal

Video Display Eavesdropping

- Kuhn and Anderson used '80s era Tempest monitor receiver
 - Basically a TV set with the tuning restrictions removed
 - Paper describes CRT experiments but claims that results apply to LCD's too

Modern Screen Display

- In Van Eck's day, monitors pulsed for each pixel
 - Giving eaves dropper a signal to work with
- In modern computer, for a solid area beam only signaled on line a start of region and end of region
 - Not a problem for text, but makes pictures without strong verticals hard to eavesdrop
- Dithering helps the eavesdropper
 - Mixing different colored pixels in a pattern
 - Changing colors causes more impulses which helps the eaves dropper
 - High frequency emanation signal easier to eavesdrop

Hiding Information in Dither

- User looking at screen cannot tell much different between a dither and a straight color
- Eavesdropper can see the changes in the dither
- See Figure 3, 4, and 5 from paper

Information Hiding Goals

- Again primarily looking at using the screen for emanation virus
- Alternatively paper suggests software companies may embed patterns in licensed software
 - Drive around license detector vans to catch software pirates, like TV detector vans in England

Anti-Tempest Fonts

- Tempest monitor particularly sensitive to high frequency emanations
- Adjust font design to remove top 30% of horizontal frequency spectrum
 - See Fig 7 and 8 in paper

Protection from EMSEC

- In general rely on shielding
 - Government provides specifications (classified) for building appropriate shielding
 - Shield devices or shield entire rooms or buildings
 - Very expensive
- Physical separation of sensitive devices from unclassified or unknown devices
 - Sensitive devices in red zone
 - Unclassified devices in black zone
 - Red zone is shielded from or physically distant from black

Other Classified Government Codewords

- NONSTOP - Appears to deal with transmitting RF signals from sensitive devices. Dating from '75
- HIJACK – Compromising digital emanations instead of electromagnetic emanations as with TEMPEST

Key Points

- Must consider how the computer world interacts with physical world
 - Be paranoid and consider all threats
 - Know where to look for evidence
- Some technology a bit out there. Probably don't need a tinfoil hat.
 - But you may want to consider one for your passport
 - <http://www.rfid-shield.com/>

Key Points

- Must consider how the computer world interacts with physical world
 - Be paranoid and consider all threats
 - Know where to look for evidence
 - In the end must tradeoff limited resources for expected security gain