

Network Security Architecture

Information Assurance

Fall 2006


Reading Material

- Intrusion Detection: Chapter 25 from Computer Security, Matt Bishop
- Network Security: Chapter 26 Computer Science: Art and Science
- “Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker”, Cheswick, Bellovin, and Rubin.
 - New second edition
- “Firewall and Internet Security, the Second Hundred (Internet) Years”
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/759/ipj_2-2/ipj_
 - A firewall overview article from 1999

Overview

- Network Security Architecture
 - Security Domains
 - VPN
- Firewall Technology
 - Address Translation
 - Denial of Service attacks
- Intrusion Detection
- Both firewalls and IDS are introductions.
 - Both are covered in more detail in the Security Lab class.
 - IDS is covered in more detail in 463 – Computer Security.

Security Domains



Perimeter Defense

- Is it adequate?
 - Locating and securing all perimeter points is quite difficult
 - Less effective for large border
 - Inspecting/ensuring that remote connections are adequately protected is difficult
 - Insiders attack is often the most damaging

Virtual Private Networks

- A private network that is configured within a public network
- A VPN “appears” to be dedicated network to customer
- The customer is actually “sharing” trunks and other physical infrastructure with other customers
- Security?
 - Depends on implementing protocol

Multiple VPN Technologies

SSL

- Confidentiality? Yes
- Data integrity? Yes
- User authentication? Yes
- Network access control? No
- In addition, limited traffic


IPSec

- Confidentiality? Yes
- Data Integrity? Yes
- User Authentication? Yes
- Network access control? Yes
- Client configuration required.


VLAN – Layer 2 tunnelling technology

- Confidentiality? No
- Data Integrity? No
- User authentication? Yes
- Network access control? Yes
- Not viable over non-VLAN internetworks

Security Domains with VPNs




“Typical” corporate network



Firewall Goal

- Insert *after the fact* security by wrapping or interposing a filter on network traffic



Application Proxy Firewall

- Firewall software runs in application space on the firewall
- The traffic source must be aware of the proxy and add an additional header
- Leverage basic network stack functionality to sanitize application level traffic
 - Block java or active X
 - Filter out “bad” URLs
 - Ensure well formed protocols or block suspect aspects of protocol
- Not used much anymore


Packet Filter Firewall

- Operates at Layer 3 in router or HW firewall
- Has access to the Layer 3 header and Layer 4 header
- Can block traffic based on source and destination address, ports, and protocol
- Does not reconstruct Layer 4 payload, so cannot do reliable analysis of layer 4 or higher content

Stateful Packet Filters

- Evolved as packet filters aimed for proxy functionality
- In addition to Layer 3 reassembly, it can reconstruct layer 4 traffic
- Some application layer analysis exists, e.g., for HTTP, FTP, H.323
 - Called context-based access control (CBAC) on IOS
 - Configured by fixup command on PIX
- Some of this analysis is necessary to enable address translation and dynamic access for negotiated data channels
- Reconstruction and analysis can be expensive.
 - Must be configured on specified traffic streams
 - At a minimum the user must tell the Firewall what kind of traffic to expect on a port
 - Degree of reconstruction varies per platform, e.g. IOS does not do IP reassembly

Traffic reconstruction



FTP: X to Y
GET /etc/passwd

GET command causes
firewall to dynamically
open data channel initiate
from Y to X


Might have filter for files to
block, like /etc/passwd

Access Control Lists (ACLs)

- Used to define traffic streams
 - Bind ACL's to interface and action
- Access Control Entry (ACE) contains
 - Source address
 - Destination Address
 - Protocol, e.g., IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, GRE
 - Source Port
 - Destination Port
- ACL runtime lookup
 - Linear
 - N-dimensional tree lookup (PIX Turbo ACL)
 - Object Groups
 - HW classification assists

Ingress and Egress Filtering

- Ingress filtering
 - Filter out packets from invalid addresses before entering your network
- Egress filtering
 - Filter out packets from invalid addresses before leaving your network



Denial of Service

- **Example attacks**
 - Smurf Attack
 - TCP SYN Attack
- **DoS general exploits resource limitations**
 - Denial by Consumption
 - Denial by Disruption
 - Denial by Reservation

TCP SYN Attack

- Exploits the three-way handshake




Figure 1. Three-way Handshake





Figure 2. SYN Flooding Attack

TCP SYN Attack Solutions

- Intermediate Firewall/Router
 - Limit number of half open connections
- Ingress and egress filtering to reduce spoofed addresses
 - Does not help against DDoS bot networks
- Reactively block attacking addresses
 - Generally expensive to acquire technology to do fast enough
- Fix Protocol - IPv6

“Smurf”

- ICMP echo (spoofed source address of victim)
- Sent to IP broadcast address
- ICMP echo reply



Smurf Issues

- Amplification attack
 - Small effort on attacker results in big impact on victim
- Victim fails unexpectedly under high load
 - May just stop responding
 - May stop performing normal security checks
- Exploiting protocol failure
 - Fixed in IPv6
- Old attack
 - Blocked by most firewalls

Address Translation


- Traditional NAT RFC 3022 Reference RFC
- Map real address to alias address
 - Real address associated with physical device, generally an unroutable address
 - Alias address generally a routeable associated with the translation device
- Originally motivated by limited access to publicly routable IP addresses
 - Folks didn't want to pay for addresses and/or hassle with getting official addresses
- Later folks said this also added security
 - By hiding structure of internal network
 - Obscuring access to internal machines
- Adds complexity to firewall technology
 - Must dig around in data stream to rewrite references to IP addresses and ports
 - Limits how quickly new protocols can be firewalled

Address Hiding (NAPT)

- Many to few dynamic mapping
 - Packets from a large pool of private addresses are mapped to a small pool of public addresses at runtime
- Port remapping makes this sharing more scalable
 - Two real addresses can be rewritten to the same alias address
 - Rewrite the source port to differentiate the streams
- Traffic must be initiated from the real side

NAT example

Hide from inside to outside
192.168.1.0/24 behind 128.274.1.1
Static map from inside to DMZ
192.168.1.5 to 128.274.1.5




Static Mapping

- One-to-one fixed mapping
 - One real address is mapped to one alias address at configuration time
 - Traffic can be initiated from either side
- Used to statically map out small set of servers from a network that is otherwise hidden
- Static port remapping is also available

NAT example

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FW Runtime Characteristics


- Firewalls track streams of traffic
 - TCP streams are obvious
 - Creates pseudo UDP streams for UCP packets between the same addresses and ports that arrive near enough to each other
- Processing first packet in stream is more expensive
 - Must evaluate ACLs and calculate address translations
 - Subsequent packets get session data from a table

Multi-legged Firewalls

- Historically firewalls have protected inside from outside
 - Still true for the most part with personal and home firewalls
 - No longer sufficient for larger enterprises
- PIX security level solution
 - Outbound = traffic from low security level interface to high security level interface
 - Inbound = traffic from high security level interface to low security level interface
 - Different requirements for inbound and outbound traffic
- IOS divides interfaces into inside and outside groups
 - Address translation can only be defined between inside and outside groups
- Routing conflicts with address translation
 - Address translation specifies both interfaces
 - Must be evaluated before the routing, better be consistent

Four Legged FW


- Static translation from DMZ to Customer
 - 10.10.10.10.1 to 128.1.1.1
- But routing table wants to route 128.1.1.1 from DMZ to outside interface
 - Static translation interface selection will win



Identity Aware Firewall

- Use TACACS+ or Radius to authenticate, authorize, account for user with respect to FW
 - For administration of FW
 - For traffic passing through FW
 - PIX cut-through proxy allows authentication on one protocol to cover other protocols from same source
- Authorization for executing commands on the device
- Download or enable ACL's
- XAuth to integrate AAA with VPN authentication and other security mechanisms

AAA Scenario



Is the Firewall Dead?

- End-to-end security (encryption) renders firewalls useless
 - Tunnels hide information that firewalls would filter or sanitize
 - With IPSec decrypting and re-encrypting is viable
- Blurring security domain perimeters
 - Who are you protecting from whom
 - Dynamic entities due to DHCP and laptops
 - More dynamic business arrangements, short term partnerships, outsourcing
- Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) is too high
 - Managing firewalls for a large network is expensive
- Perhaps personal or distributed firewalls are the answer?
 - “Implementing a Distributed Firewall”
<http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~angelos/Papers/df.pdf>

Intrusion Detection

- Holy Grail: Detect and correct “bad” system behavior
- Detection can be viewed in two parts
 - Anomaly detection: Use statistical techniques to determine unusual behavior
 - Mis-use detection: Use signatures to determine occurrence of known attacks
- Detection can be performed on host data (HIDS), network data (NIDS), or a hybrid of both

Intrusion Handling

- Preparation for attack
- Identification of the attack
- Containment of the attack
 - Gather information about the attacker
 - Honeypots
- Eradication
 - Broadly quarantine the system so it can do no more harm
 - BGP blackholing
 - Tighten firewalls
 - Cleanse the corrupted system
- Followup phase
 - Gather evidence and take action against the attacker

IDS Architecture

- Agents run at the lowest level gathering data. Perform some basic processing.
- Agents send data to a Director that performs more significant processing of the data. Potentially there is a hierarchy of agents and directors
 - Director has information from multiple sources and can perform a time-based correlation to derive more significant actions
- Directors invoke Notifiers to perform some action in response to a detected attack
 - Popup a window on a screen
 - Send an email or a page
 - Send a new syslog message elsewhere.
 - Adjust a firewall or some other policy to block future action from the attacker

Data Sources

- Direct data
 - Network packets
 - System calls
- Indirect data
 - Syslog data, Windows event logs
 - Events from other intrusion detection systems
 - Netflow information generated by routers about network traffic

Mis-use/Signature Detection

- Fixed signatures are used in most deployed IDS products
 - E.g., Cisco, ISS, Snort
- Like virus scanners, part of the value of the product is the team of people producing new signatures for newly observed malevolent behavior
- The static signature mechanism has obvious problems in that a dedicated attacker can adjust his behaviour to avoid matching the signature.
- The volume of signatures can result in many false positives
 - Must tune the IDS to match the characteristics of your network
 - E.g., what might be unusual in a network of Unix systems might be normal in a network of Windows Systems (or visa versa)
 - Can result in IDS tuned too low to miss real events
 - Can hide real attacks in the mass of false positives

Example Signature

- Signature for port sweep
 - A set of TCP packets attempting to connect to a sequence of ports on the same device in a fixed amount of time
- In some environments, the admin might run nmap periodically to get an inventory of what is on the network
 - You would not want to activate this signature in that case


Anomaly/statistical detection

- Seems like using statistics will result in a more adaptable and self-tuning system
 - Statistics, neural networks, data mining, etc.
- How do you characterize normal?
 - Create training data from observing “good” runs
 - E.g., Forrest’s program system call analysis
 - Use visualization to rely on your eyes
- How do you adjust to real changes in behaviour?
 - Gradual changes can be easily addressed. Gradually adjust expected changes over time
 - Rapid changes can occur. E.g., different behaviour after work hours or changing to a work on the next project

Host Based IDS

- Tripwire – Very basic detection of changes to installed binaries
- More recent HIDS. Look at patterns of actions of system calls, file activity, etc. to permit, deny, or query operations
 - Cisco Security Agent
 - Symantec
 - McAfee Enterccept

Classical NIDS deployment




NIDS Remediation Options

- Log the event
- Drop the connection
- Reset the connection
- Change the configuration of a nearby router or firewall to block future connections

Intrusion Protection Systems (IPS)

- Another name for inline NIDS
- Latest buzz among the current NIDS vendors
- Requires very fast signature handling
 - Slow signature handling will not only miss attacks but it will also cause the delay of valid traffic
 - Specialized hardware required for high volume gateways
- When IDS is inline, the intrusion detector can take direct steps to remediate.
- If you move IDS into the network processing path, how is this different from really clever firewalling?

Network IPS scenario



Summary

- Identification of security domains basis of perimeter security control
 - Firewall is the main enforcer
- Intrusion detection introduces deeper analysis and potential for more dynamic enforcement
- Intermediate enforcement can handle some Denial of Service attacks