

# Evaluating Systems

Information Assurance

Fall 2006

# Reading Material

- Chapter 21 Computer Security: Art and Science
- The orange book and the whole rainbow series
  - <http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/>
- The common criteria
  - Lists all evaluated protection profiles and products
  - <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>

# Outline

- Motivation for system evaluation
- Specific evaluation systems
  - TCSEC/Orange Book
  - Interim systems
  - Common Criteria

# Evaluation Goals

- Oriented to purchaser/user of system
- Assurance that system operates as advertised

# Evaluation Options

- Rely on vendor/developer evidence
  - Self-evaluate vendor design docs, test results, etc
  - Base on reputation of vendor
- Rely on an expert
  - Read product evaluations from trusted source
  - Penetration testing

# Formal Evaluation

- Provide a systematic framework for system evaluation
  - More consistent evaluation
  - Better basis for comparing similar product
- Trusted third party system for evaluation
- Originally driven by needs of government and military

# TCSEC: 1983-1999

- Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) also called the Orange Book
  - Specifies evaluation classes (C1, C2, B1, B2, B3, A1)
  - Specifies functionality and assurance requirements for each class
- Functional Model builds on
  - BLP (mandatory labeling)
  - Reference Monitors

# Reference Monitor

- Reference Monitor – abstract machine that mediates all access to objects by subjects
- Reference Validation Mechanism (RVM) – Implementation of a Reference Monitor
  - Tamper-proof
  - Well defined
  - Never bypassed
  - Small enough for analysis and testing

# Trusted Computing Base (TCB)

- Includes all protection mechanisms including HW, firmware, and software responsible for enforcing the security policy
- Strong boundary around the TCB is critical
  - Any code trusted by element of TCB must be part of TCB too.
  - If portion of TCB is corrupted, must consider that all of the TCB can be corrupted

# TCSEC Functional Requirements

- DAC
- Object Reuse
  - Sufficient clearing of objects between uses in resource pool
  - E.g. zero pages in memory system
- MAC and Labels
- Identification and Authentication
- Audit
  - requirements increase at higher classes
- Trusted Path
  - Non-spoofable means to interact with TCB
  - Ctl-Alt-Del in Windows

# TCSEC Assurance Requirements

- Configuration Management
  - For TCB
- Trusted Distribution
  - Integrity of mapping between master and installations
- System Architecture
  - Small and modular
- Design Specification – vary between classes
- Verification – Vary between classes
- Testing
- Product Documentation

# TCSEC Classes

- D – Catch all
- C1 – Discretionary Protection
  - Identification and authentication and DAC
  - Minimal Assurance
- C2 – Control access protection
  - Adds object reuse and auditing
  - More testing requirements
  - Windows NT 3.5 evaluated C2

# TCSEC Classes

- B1 – Labeled Security Protection
  - Adds MAC for some objects
  - Stronger testing requirements. Information model of security policy.
  - Trusted Unixes tended to be B1
- B2 – Structured protection
  - MAC for all objects. Additional logging. Trusted Path. Least privilege.
  - Covert channel analysis, configuration management, more documentation, formal model of security policy

# TCSEC Classes

- B3 – Security Domains
  - Implements full RVM. Requirements on code modularity, layering, simplicity.
  - More stringent testing and documentation.
- A1 – verified protection
  - Same functional requirements as B3
  - Significant use of formal methods in assurance
  - Honeywell's SCOMP

# TCSEC Evaluation process

- Originally controlled by government
  - No fee to vendor
  - May reject evaluation application if product not of interest to government
- Later introduced fee-based evaluation labs
- Evaluation phases
  - Design analysis – no source code access
  - Test analysis
  - Final review

# TCSEC Evaluation Issues

- Evaluating a specific configuration
  - E.g., Window NT, no applications installed, no network
  - New patches, versions require re-certification
    - RAMP introduced to ease re-certifications
- Long time for evaluation
  - Sometimes product was obsolete before evaluation finished
- Criteria Creep
  - B1 means something more in 1999 than it did in 1989

# Interim Efforts in the '90s

- Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC)
- Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) – Western Europe
- Commercial International Security Requirements (CISR) – AmEx and EDS
- Federal Criteria – NSA and NIST

# FIPS 140

- Framework for evaluating Cryptographic Modules
- Still in Use
- Addresses
  - Functionality
  - Assurance
  - Physical security

# Common Criteria – 1998 to today

- Pulls together international evaluation efforts
  - Evaluations mean something between countries
- Three top level documents
  - Common Criteria Documents
    - Describe functional and assurance requirements. Defines Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs)
  - CC Evaluation Methodology (CEM)
    - More details on the valuation. Complete through EAL5 (at least)
  - Evaluation Scheme
    - National specific rules for how CC evals are performed in that country
    - Directed by NIST in US

# CC Terminology

- Target of Evaluation (TOE)
  - The product being evaluated
- TOE Security Policy (TSP)
  - Rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected, and distributed in a product
- TOE Security Functions (TSF)
  - Implementation of the TSP
  - Generalization of the TCB

# Protection Profile (PP)

- Profile that describes the security requirements for a class of products
  - List of evaluated PP's  
<http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/public/expert/index>
- Replaces the fixed set of classes from TCSEC
- ISSO created some initial profiles to match TCSEC classes
  - Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP) corresponds to C2
  - Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP) corresponds to B1

# Product evaluation

- Define a security target (ST)
  - May leverage an evaluated protection profile
- Evaluated with respect to the ST

# CC Functional Requirements

- Defined in a taxonomy
  - Top level 11 classes
    - E.g., FAU – Security audit and FDP – User Data Protection
  - Each class divided into families
    - E.g., FDP\_ACC – Access control policy
  - Each family divided into components
    - E.g., FDP\_ACC.2 – Complete access control
  - Each component contains requirements and dependencies on other requirements

# CC Assurance Requirements

- Similar class, family, component taxonomy
- Eight product oriented assurance classes
  - ACM – Configuration Management
  - ADO – Delivery and Operation
  - ADV – Development
  - AGD – Guidance Documentation
  - ALC – Life Cycle
  - ATE – Tests
  - AVA – Vulnerability Analysis
  - AMA – Maintenance of Assurance

# Evaluation Assurance Levels

- 7 fixed EALs
  - EAL1 – Functionality Tested
  - EAL2 – Structurally Tested
  - EAL3 – Methodically tested and checked
    - Analogous to C2
  - EAL4 – Methodically Designed, Tested, and Reviewed
  - EAL5 – Semiformally Designed and Tested
  - EAL6 – Semiformally Verified Design and Tested
  - EAL7 – Formally Verified Design and Tested

# CC Evaluation Process in US

- NIST provides accreditation of third party evaluation labs
  - Vendor pays lab
  - Lab works with oversight board
- Evaluate both PP's and Products
- List of evaluated products
  - <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/public/con>

# Certifying Process

- Gain assurance from knowledge of developers process
  - ISO 9000
  - SEI's Capability Maturity Model(CMM)
  - System Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM)
    - <http://www.sse-cmm.org>

# System Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model

- SSE-CMM - <http://www.sse-cmm.org>
  - Based on SEI's SE-CMM
- Divide software development into process areas (which are further divided into processes)
  - E.g., Assess Threat, Coordinate Security, Assess impact
- Plus some process areas from base SE-CMM
  - E.g., Ensure Quality, Plan Technical Effort

# Capability Maturity Levels

- An organization is evaluated at a maturity level for these process areas and processes
  ١. Performed informally
  ٢. Planned and tracked
  ٣. Well-defined
  ٤. Quantitatively controlled
  ٥. Continuously improving

# Key Points

- Evaluation for the benefit of the customer
- Product Evaluations
  - Functional Requirements
  - Assurance Requirements
- Process Evaluation

# Security Requirements

- Justify security requirements by associating requirements with threats
- Identified during project requirements phase
  - Use security requirements to drive security architecture
  - Identify assets to protect
    - Rank importance of asset
    - Cost/benefit
- Decide on mechanisms to use
  - Select HW, OS, MW, App layer
- Build in security from the start if possible